Herbert
Simon講座系列#19
Behavioral
Economics & Experimental
Economics
行為經濟學與實驗經濟學
http://www.aiecon.org/herbertsimon/
自2002年諾貝爾奬頒給了Vernon
Smith 和Daniel
Kahneman之後，行為經濟學和實驗經濟學，就佔了與新古典經濟學時而為互補、時而為替代的重要地位。而Herbert
Simon 在行為經濟學發展之初，雖佔有極大的貢獻，但其影響卻在晚近常被忽略或被錯誤的詮釋。Prof.
Kumaraswamy
(Vela) Velupillai 乃跨計算經濟學及行為
經濟學二領域之大師，他於以下兩場演講中，除了介紹當前行為經濟學的發展外，並會介紹Herbert
Simon 的行為經濟學（Prof.
Velupillai 稱之為古典行為經濟學）和當代行為經濟學間的關係，這是放諸目前文獻所少見的內容。
Prof.
Velupillai 在介紹古典行為經濟學中，會特別將Herbert
Simon 的思想啟蒙與計算理論之父 Alan
Turin 的傳承建構起來，並進而闡述古典行為經濟學中的可計算（Computable） 基礎。至於可計算經濟
學與行為經濟學及實驗經濟學間的關係，則將在Prof.
Stephen Kinsella 的兩場演講中延續。
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議程Program
Schedule:
時間 Time |
講者
Speaker |
題目Title |
地點 Place |
3/17/
2010, 18:00
– 20:00 |
Prof.
Kumaraswamy (Vela) Velupillai |
Reviving
the Simon Tradition in Behavioural Economics |
政大綜合院館南棟10樓經濟系研討室 Room
271034, 10F, General Building South, NCCU |
3/20/
2010, 14:00 – 17:00 |
Prof.
Stephen
Kinsella |
Experimental
Recipes |
政大綜合院館南棟10樓經濟系研討室 Room
271034, 10F, General Building South, NCCU |
3/23/
2010, 14:00 – 16:00 |
Prof.
Kumaraswamy (Vela) Velupillai |
Behavioural
Economics: Classical and Modern |
政大綜合院館南棟10樓經濟系研討室 Room
271034, 10F, General Building South, NCCU |
3/
24/ 2010, 18:00 – 20:00 |
Prof.
Stephen
Kinsella |
The
'Computable' in experimental economics |
政大綜合院館南棟10樓經濟系研討室 Room
271034, 10F, General Building South, NCCU |
主辦單位Sponsor：國立政治大學經濟系(Economics
Department,
National Chengchi University)
協辦單位
Co-sponsors：國立政治大學頂大辦公室、國家科學委員會
(Top University Program of National Chengchi University, National
Science
Council)
摘要
Abstracts:
Prof.
Kumaraswamy (Vela) Velupillai
“There
are
many levels of complexity in problems, and corresponding boundaries
between
them. Turing computability is an outer boundary, and as you show, any
theory
that requires more power than that surely is irrelevant to any useful
definition of human rationality.”
Letter
from
Herbert Simon to Vela Velupillai, 25 May, 2000
Lecture
I: Reviving the Simon
Tradition in Behavioural Economics
No
one person combined and encapsulated, in an intrinsically
dynamic framework, a computationally founded^{§} theoretical
system of
choice and decision, both entirely rational in a broad sense, than
Herbert
Simon. In this lecture I try, in fairly precise and formal ways, to
suggest
computable foundations for boundedly rational choice and satisficing
decisions.
In a nutshell, the aim is to reformulate, with textual support from
Herbert
Simon's characterizations and suggestions, bounded rationality and
satisficing
in a computable framework so that their intrinsic complex dynamics is
made
explicit in as straightforward a way as possible. To achieve this aim,
in the
tradition of Simon, I start from orthodox underpinnings of rational
choice
theory and extract its inherent procedural content, which is usually
submerged
in the inappropriate mathematics of standard real analysis.
In
his fascinating and, indeed, provocative and challenging article
titled, What
is Bounded Rationality?^{ª}, Reinhard Selten first wonders
what
bounded rationality is, and then goes on to state that an answer to the
question `cannot be given' now:
"What
is bounded rationality? A complete answer to this question cannot be
given at
the present state of the art. However, empirical findings put limits to
the concept
and indicate in which direction further inquiry should go."
In a definitive sense - entirely
consistent with the computational underpinnings Simon always sought - I
try to
give a `complete answer' to Selten's finessed question. I go further
and would
like to claim that the `limits to the concept' derived from current
`empirical
findings' cannot point the direction Simon would have endorsed for
`further
inquiry' to go - simply because current frameworks are devoid of the
computable
underpinnings that were the hallmark of Simon's behavioural economics.
Lecture
II: Behavioural Economics:
Classical and Modern
I
begin
this lecture with an explication of the following three fundamental
theorems of
classical computability theory, computable analysis and real analysis,
respectively:
1.
The
Blum Speedup Theorem
2.
Specker’s
Theorem
3.
The
Bolzano-Weierstrass Theorem
I use
these three classic theorems, and their explicit and implicit
invocations in
varieties of mathematical economics, to motivate a discussion
of the
fundamental difference between classical and modern behavioural
economics.
With
this
motivation as a backdrop, I next characterize the formal difference
between
classical and modern behavioural economics in terms of the difference
between
decision problems and optimization problems.
Assuming
familiarity
with, if not also complete knowledge of, the formal mechanisms and
analytics of optimization theory – in all its many splendours,
including game
theoretic and in all the standard varieties of dynamic settings – I
concentrate, next, on defining and explaining the nature, scope and
formal
machinery underpinning decision problems. This leads, almost naturally,
to a
consideration of complexity classes of decision problems and,
therefore,
underpins the natural setting in which bounded rationality, satisficing
and
problem solving – and problem solvers – become the foundations on which
classical behavioural economics was erected, almost single-handedly by
Herbert
Simon.
This
is
contrasted with the framework and mathematical foundations of modern
behavioural economics, which remains within the fold of variations of
optimization theory, which is – and, indeed, can be shown to be – a
special
case of decision problems.
Brief
remarks on algorithmic probability theory as a foundation for classical
behavioural economics and the contrast with classical – either
varieties of
subjective or measure-theoretic – probability theory underpinning
modern
behavioural economics, conclude this lecture.
Abstract
1:
Experimental Recipes
This
first talk
introduces students to experimental economics in a
practical way: we will view the creation of an economic experiment
like a short-order cook views a meal: as the creation of a simple
series of steps combined in a certain order. Later, we’ll fill in the
theoretical blanks we left behind.
Experiments in economics have gained currency in the last 40 years,
culminating in the award of the ‘Nobel’ prize in economics to Vernon
Smith in 2002. More distinguished experimenters are sure to receive
the prize in coming years. The AIECON lab has world-renowned expertise
in computational intelligence. Experimental studies of intelligence,
broadly defined, and in a Simonian sense, will serve to bolster and
augment the research currently being undertaken at the lab.
This talk introduces students to the planning and running of a real
world experiment. We’ll define terms as we go. The object of the first
lecture is to be as ‘hands on’ as possible with the material.
Abstract
2:
The 'Computable' in experimental economics
Computable
economics is
the natural theoretical underpinning for
modern experimental economics: this lecture delves into the history of
experimental economics, and suggests points of tangency and fruitful
convergences between computable economics and experimental economics.
A road map for computable and experimental economics---linked
fundamentally to computational intelligence---is given.